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1. Introduction 
 
Among development professionals, three widely held stereotypes are: 
 
1. The private sector is more efficient than the public sector. 
2. Public sectors in developing and transition nations tend to be particularly 
inefficient, as well as corrupt, relative to those in more developed economies. 
3. Public sectors in developing and transition nations tend to operate in spheres 
normally (and better) served by the private sector.   
 
In that they are generally true, these are good stereotypes.  Study after study, across all 
continents, have demonstrated a positive relationship between the degree of privatization 
and productivity (see Djankov and Murrell (2002) for a comprehensive summary, and 
Brown, Earle, and Telegdy (2004) for a more recent paper).  It is not surprising, 
therefore, that both International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and 
EBRD, and bilateral donor agencies, such as USAID, encourage privatizations, even 
gauging a nation’s progress, in part, by increases in the percent of all production 
accounted for by the private sector. 
 
These assistance organizations also promote public-private partnerships (PPPs).1   
The word “partnership” suggests that the parties are co-equal or, at least, that their 
participation is desirable.  However, PPPs are often, arguably most often, seen as second 
best arrangements when governments are reluctant to relinquish all control.  In other 
words, PPPs are devices for reducing the public sector’s share in production and are 
resorted to when governments refuse to exit the stage entirely.  So, the public partner in a 
PPP is there due to history and power, rather than its ability to add value.  With luck, a 
PPP will be temporary, preparatory to the preferred solution of total privatization.  In 
most instances, this view is correct.  But we will argue that there are cases in which 
public sector involvement can lead to better outcomes than full privatization.  The heart 
of this argument is that the two sectors have different qualities and intensities of asset 
endowments.  They have different things to bring to the table and it is out of such 
differences that potentials any mutually advantageous partnership exists.    
 
                                                 
1 For example, several IFIs and bilateral donors are involved in the PPIAF, the Public-Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility.  This organization is “aimed at helping developing countries improve the quality of their 
infrastructure though private sector involvement.”  http://ppiaf.org/  
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Before proceeding, however, a caveat or warning should be added.  While there 
can be significant benefits from PPPs, there are dangers of abuses, particularly in 
developing/transition countries with weaker institutions.  Businesspersons might exploit 
the access to public officials afforded by the PPP to exert influence.  It is a two-way street 
in that PPPs could also afford bureaucrats additional opportunities for corruption.    
 
The central example for the discussion in this paper is Armenia, one of the nations 
emerging from the Communist extreme of too much government involvement in the 
economy.  Certainly of primary importance is removal of unreasonable constraints on the 
private sector while establishing reasonable rules and enforcement systems for 
government to guard against market failures.  Luckily, Armenia has and continues to 
make considerable strides in this direction.  While the necessary and appropriate principal 
direction of change involves shrinking government’s role in the economy, it does not 
follow that government has no role to play nor that the role should be only as a referee.  
Indeed during the transition period, government may need to take on some additional 
tasks to promote the previously near-dormant private sector, which is taking steps to 
establish itself in the new reality. 
  
And the new reality is not a very friendly one. Despite the progress in 
macroeconomic performance in recent years, Armenia remains a country with a low per 
capita income, few natural resources, and depleting human capital stock.  Outside of a 
few Diaspora-led investment projects, very little is happening on the ground, with the 
lack of progress with replenishment of the existing capital stock and investments into 
new technologies being a source of serious concern.  In addition, despite the EBRD’s 
recent upbeat statements about Armenia’s structural reform progress (EBRD, 2005), state 
capture remains high, rendering the investment climate unfriendly, to say the least. Trust 
between private and public sectors is very low, leading to a paralyzing situation where 
private sector agents are likely to play safe and adopt a wait-and-see approach instead of 
investing in search of profits. Irregularities and subsequent turmoil that followed the 2003 
presidential and parliamentary elections did not help generate confidence both in terms of 
economic policy as well as political risk. 
 
The observed progress on macroeconomic level is not broad-based.  A number of 
private monopolies and export-import ventures (which are connected to the state and 
form the base of special interest groups, to be dealt with later in the paper) dominate the 
corporate landscape, leading to sizable economy-wide welfare losses (Holden and 
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Sahakyan, 2005).  This situation creates problems related to distribution, with growth 
failing to translate into higher social standards, thus slowing down the formation of the 
middle class and hampering the development of institutions, and, through these, harming 
the growth prospects in the long run.  Armenian workers are still competitive, at least on 
CIS and East European labor markets, making emigration a less traumatic experience 
and, therefore, more likely to be chosen than it otherwise could be.  Expectations do 
influence economic outcomes, and observed problems with redistribution and economic 
fairness only fuel unfavorable expectations about the future.  When property and basic 
human rights are at stake, the agents’ incentives to stick around and succeed are greatly 
diminished. Delaying actions to move out of this standstill could be costly owing to: (1) 
continuing formation and strengthening of special interests, (2) challenges of dealing with 
years of below-optimal investment in education and infrastructure development, and (3) 
continued emigration. 
 
Other, though related, reasons for low investment and business formation rates 
include all the usual impediments faced in transition economies, as well as uncertainties 
related to regional instability, isolation from large export markets, and the small size of 
the domestic economy.  An important and, as yet, under-exploited asset is the large 
Diaspora of ethnic Armenians around the world.2  Given reasonable chance of positive 
results and availability of appropriate vehicles for involvement, it seems certain that 
many Diaspora Armenians would become more involved in Armenia for volunteer 
activities to advance social and cultural causes, as well as for business ventures and 
investments to bring about economic growth and development (Gevorkyan and 
Grigorian, 2003). 
 
In this paper, we assert that: 
 
1. Differences between the endowments and capabilities of the public and private 
sectors create opportunities for mutually advantageous public private cooperation 
(PPP), capable of addressing a large portion of problems discussed above.   
 
                                                 
2 Armenia is one of the few nations of the world with a Diaspora of its dominant ethnic group at least twice 
as large as its own population. 
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2. PPPs can be used to approach a diverse set of tasks.  Such applications may be 
particularly appropriate for overcoming shortfalls in transition-type environments, 
where both government and market failures are common.3 
 
3. There is a range of structures or organizational arrangements for implementing PPPs.  
Which organizational arrangement is appropriate depends upon the nature and 
duration of the task and the types of assets and talents available from the two sectors.  
 
PPPs could be important in mitigating the above-described problems and 
exploiting opportunities, such as realizing greater involvement by the Diaspora.  But 
there should be careful assessment of the conditions in which they could become 
advantageous and the forms they could take.  As with any partnerships, PPPs must offer 
advantages for both sides with clearly defined responsibilities. 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, differences in what the 
private and public sector can ‘bring to the table’ to contribute to PPPs are outlined along 
with organizational alternatives for such cooperation.  To demonstrate that PPPs are not 
just second best alternatives for Developing/Transition nations, the example of Ireland is 
briefly discussed.  In the fourth and main section of the paper, the types of tasks for 
which PPPs could be appropriate are reviewed and specific examples discussed.4 The 
latter largely refer to correcting various types of market failures and observed 
irregularities in the prevailing business climate.  In the fifth section problems and 
opportunities regarding PPPs associated with the existence of special interests are 
examined.  Finally, the results are summarized and conclusions drawn. 
 
 
2. Rationales and Organizational Alternatives for PPPs 
 
2.1. Difference, the Soul of Partnership 
 
PPPs are partnerships.  There are inherent economies in all viable partnerships in 
that the partners are able to produce more value together than would be the sum of their 
individual efforts.  It is this surplus over their individual efforts that creates the mutual 
                                                 
3 See Kuznetsov (2002)’s references to Russia. 
4 These are both ongoing PPPs in Armenia as well as potential opportunities for PPPs. 
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advantage.  Partnerships should not form without potentials for realizing mutual 
advantage and should be allowed to dissolve if they fail to arise or dissipate.  For there to 
be mutual advantage, as with any form of trade, each party is expected to bring 
something to the table—assets, talents, rights, powers—not possessed or possessed with 
different relative intensities by their counterparts.  In other words, the potential for 
partnership arises from differences.  In Table 1 some of the differences between what 
government and the private sector can offer are outlined. 
    
2.2. Alternative PPP Organizational Structures 
 
Organizations can employ a spectrum of structures to facilitate cooperation.  Each 
has its own strengths and weaknesses.  The choice of a specific structure depends upon 
the nature and duration of the task envisioned and the assets and capacities available from 
each sector.  For expositional convenience, we divide organizational choices into four 
types: 
 
• Non-Invasive Cooperation (NIC) 
• Management  Contracts (MC) 
• Concessions (CONC) 
• Joint Ownership-based Cooperation (JOC)  
 
Non-Invasive Cooperation is defined as cooperative endeavors in which none of 
the cooperating organizations, in any meaningful way, assumes authority over all or part 
of other cooperators.  It is cooperation in the sense that the partners exchange information 
and coordinate some aspects of their actions to realize mutual gains, but they do this at 
arms length, with no party usurping direct control over another.  For example, the 
Government of Armenia (GOA) and a private firm might coordinate their shipments to 
take advantage of volume discounts in transport.   In a disaster, GOA and a non-
governmental organization (NGO), such as CARE, might agree on regions in which each 
has primary responsibility for providing assistance, thereby avoiding duplication, and 
maintain contact about their stocks of relief supplies to be able to cover temporary 
shortages each might have. 
 
 The primary strengths of NICs are flexibility and speed.  They are flexible as they 
can be used in a very wide array of situations.   Essentially, whenever the primary 
objective of cooperation is not to rectify an internal problem of one partner and/or if the 
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‘defective’ partner can entirely vacate an area in favor of another partner5, an NIC can be 
employed.    
 
NICs can be established quickly, relative to other arrangements, for two reasons.  
First, because each organization treats its partners as independent “black boxes,” NICs 
are relatively simple.  There is no need to assess the relative internal strengths of the 
partners and design mechanisms for effecting cross-organization managerial and facility 
linkages to take advantage of these differences.  Second, as the autonomy and 
managements of each organization is not threatened, there is less potential for political or 
bureaucratic resistance, i.e., turf battles.  For the same reasons, it is relatively easy to set 
limits to, and conditions for, ending NICs. 
 
The primary weakness of NICs is that they do not take advantage of opportunities 
for cross-organization mechanisms, which could improve the internal performance of the 
partners.  When such potentials exist, an NIC may be a quick fix, but not an optimal one.  
Even in such circumstances, an NIC may be useful as an interim arrangement. 
 
A Management Contract is a device for transferring ownership-like 
responsibilities without actually transferring ownership rights.  An MC is simply an 
agreement in which an organization hires an external management team for part of its 
operations.  MCs are appropriate when an organization wishes to obtain external 
managerial expertise, but not outside investment.   For example, these are common 
throughout formerly socialist countries, for operating upscale, state-owned hotels.  MCs 
may also be used for essentially non-commercial units, such as national parks and 
prisons.  MCs normally define: 
 
• Areas over which the management team has authority; 
• Operational parameters, such as service frequencies or minimum production 
amounts, quality standards, employment minimums, pricing, etc.;6 
• Compensation;7 
                                                 
5 For example, if GOA were unable to provide medical services to an isolated part of the country, perhaps 
due to an emergency elsewhere, it might agree to cede those functions entirely to an interested NGO.  
6 Particularly if the MC is viewed by the organization as a transition phase, the management team may be 
obligated to perform tasks, such as training. 
7 Since an important goal of MCs typically is not only to obtain more skilled but also a better motivated and 
entrepreneurial management, compensation normally is tied closely to performance.  Compensation 
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• Length of the contract and renewal options.8    
 
Since investments are not sought, it is relatively easy to attract potential 
management teams.  Also, because the organization holds all of the equity and through its 
rights to review performance and cancel the contract, it is clearly in ultimate control.   
 
It should be pointed out, however, that designing an MC can be a lengthy and 
difficult process.  The primary difficulty of MCs is the complexity of ensuring 
consistency between management team incentives and organization goals.9  This is 
particularly true as underlying economic conditions change and because management 
team incentives are likely to transform as the end of the contract term nears.  Another 
problematic area, in this regard, are incentives related to additional tasks, such as 
training, intended to have the management team create its own replacements.  If the 
management contract is lucrative, incentives for delaying or even sabotaging these tasks 
are evident.   
 
 That said, ‘complexity’ is not meant to imply ‘impossibility.’  Indeed, if 
potential incentive problems are recognized at the outset, corrective compensatory 
mechanisms can be developed.   For example, the management team could receive a 
bonus related both to how expeditiously it is able to train a replacement team and the 
unit’s profitability.  The bonus would be designed to compensate, wholly or partially, the 
management team for the present value of the earnings it would have realized had it 
delayed its training program.   Similarly, the management team might be given a bonus 
based on growth and improvements effected toward the end of the contract term to allow 
it to capitalize on improvements which, otherwise, would have primarily benefited the 
management team’s successor.  In the absence of such bonuses, a management team 
                                                                                                                                                 
systems should align, as closely as possible, the goals of the institution and the self-interest of the 
management team. 
8 It is important to have contract lengths sufficiently long to allow a management team to become well-
established, make and recover from inevitable mistakes, and reap significant rewards from improvements it 
effects.  On the other hand, overly lengthy contract periods may weaken incentives from competitive 
threats from other management teams wishing to take over when the contract is again open for bids. 
9 This is identical to issues about alignment of incentives of corporate managements with those of the 
owners, but with the added complications that stock cannot be issued to the managers also to make them 
owners and the owner (i.e., the State) may have non-economic as well as economic goals for the unit.  
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nearing the end of a contract period would have incentives to maximize current earnings 
by deferring maintenance and improvements.10     
 
 In some instances, management team performance can be guaranteed, in part, by 
the broader impact unsatisfactory performance would have on that firm’s reputation.  In 
reality, an MC is a form of franchise agreement, with the management team being the 
franchiser.  If unsatisfactory performance in one locality would impact negatively on 
earnings in other locations, through the negative effects on firm reputation, then the 
management team would have added incentives to ensure high performance.   Examples 
of this include MCs held by worldwide hotel operators.        
 
 
The only difference between MCs and Concessions is that with the latter, the firm 
providing the management team is also expected to make capital (i.e., investment) 
commitments.  Particularly if the capital investment is significant, relative to the existing 
capital, the concession may be referred to as a BOT, for Build Operate Transfer.  If the 
terms of the management contract stipulate that no capital commitments are required, 
then that contract is an MC, but if the management company must also make investments, 
it is a CONC.  For this reason, discussion of CONCs will be abbreviated. 
 
The requirement for investment would most likely limit CONCs to commercially 
viable enterprises.  However, CONCs can and frequently are used to between 
governments and NGOs to advance social or cultural causes.  As an example, for over 10 
years, the state-owned Arabkir Medical Center for Children in Yerevan has allowed a 
joint venture between a Swiss and an Armenian NGO, VAD/DAA, to occupy two large 
buildings in return for providing schooling, psycho-social counseling, lodging, and other 
services for the hospital’s patients and their families.  The NGO has made hundreds of 
thousands of dollars of investments on these facilities.  While it is doubtful if anyone 
directly involved refers to the arrangement as a concession, in fact it is. 
 
 The opportunities and problems associated with CONCs are identical to those 
for MCs, with the exception of the impact of the concessionaire’s investments.  One 
impact is that, as investments are expected for CONCs, all things equal, it would be 
                                                 
10 A condition for renewing the contract could be forfeiture of bonuses designed to avoid non-optimal 
behavior toward the end of contract periods.   
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harder than for MCs, to attract firms.  Compensation schemes would have to compensate 
appropriately, including mechanisms to avoid perverse behaviors toward the end of the 
contract period.  In addition, a (desirable) potential concessionaire might recognize 
opportunities for effecting revenue generating improvements through investments which 
would be absent with total reliance on commitments from the State.  Potential 
concessionaires should also recognize that investments would be leveraged by the value 
of the State assets and the fact that the State’s ownership may dissuade potential rent-
seeking by government bureaucrats.11   
 
Public and private sector entities may cooperate by virtue of common ownership 
of assets, hence the name Joint Ownership-based Cooperation. A typical example of 
JOC could be joint public-private ownership of utility companies, which although secures 
private sector involvement to attract new technology and private funds, may not be fully 
privately-owned due mainly to social functions performed by utilities. Even though JOC 
requires joint ownership, this does not, in itself, indicate the nature of the cooperation.  If 
the functions of the JOC are sufficiently separable (e.g., different stages of a production  
process) one sector may operate one part and the other another part and actual 
cooperation be NIC.  On the other hand, an entity in one sector or the other may assume 
overall management, resulting in MC or CONC structure.  Finally, in some cases, 
ownership might effectively be a portfolio holding, with no actual involvement, much 
less cooperation. 
  
The primary practical importance of a JOC is liquidity.   Particularly if the stock 
is listed on a recognized exchange and shares are in reasonably small denominations, it is 
relatively easy to effect changes in ownership compositions. 
  
The PPP types and relative strengths and weaknesses are outlined in Table 2. 
 
Box 1. Not Just Poor Man’s Strategy—the Example of Ireland 
 
If PPPs were solely devices to nudge governments out of arenas better served by 
the private sector, they would be rare or non-existent in developed, capitalistic 
economies.  The Republic of Ireland, one of the most progressive economies in the 
                                                 
11 As noted earlier, it should be recognized that State involvement may create opportunities for rent-seeking 
by bureaucrats. 
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world, offers an example of the value and flexibility of PPPs.  With a view toward 
“combining the best of the public and private sectors with an emphasis on value for 
money”12  the Government of Ireland established the Central PPP Policy Unit in its 
Ministry of Finance.  It currently has 53 projects underway or in planning.   The 
estimated total value of these projects is between €5 and €8 billion.  These include 
projects between the private sector and: 
 
Government Agency   Number of projects 
National Roads Authority     10 
Courts Service          1  
Department of Education and Science   4 
Department of Health and Children    1 
Arts, Sport, and Tourism     1 
Office of Public Works     1 
Irish Prison Service/Department of Justice  
 Equality and Law Reform    2 
Department of  Transport/Railway  
Procurement Agency     3 
 Department of Environment, Heritage,  
  and Local Government   30 
 
The projects range from development and/or operations of roads, ports, and rails to 
housing, prisons, and even gardens.  Arrangements vary from simple management 
contracts to long term concessions with significant investment requirements.     
 
 
 
3. Potential Applications for PPPs in Armenia 
 
Having established the topology of possible types of public-private cooperation, 
we would like to point out that PPPs may be employed to tackle two different types of 
tasks: (1) those which would otherwise be performed strictly within and by the private 
sector, having public sector entities assist in their implementation, or (2) those performed 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 See “Welcome to the Irish Government Public Private Partnership (PPP) Website” at 
http://www.ppp.gov.ie/  
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within and by the public sector, having private sector entities assist in improving their 
efficiency. 13   Employing this division (between measures to improve performance of 
what would normally be either private or public sector functions), below we discuss some 
specific problem areas for which PPPs potentially could be used to advantage.  Examples 
are presented of existing PPPs in Armenia or potential opportunities for them.  The listing 
and the examples are not exhaustive.  Indeed, they are intended primarily to convey a 
sense of the range of possible applications, by also discussing concrete measures to 
address the underlying problems. 
 
 
3.1. Improving Public Sector Performance 
 
A. Improving Efficiency of Core Functions 
 
There are some functions, such as customs, prisons, preservation of significant 
historic and natural sites, social security, mass transit, and defense, which are almost 
universally accepted as public sector responsibilities.  While government certainly cannot 
abrogate its obligation to ensure these are carried out, in some cases PPPs can be 
employed to enhance performance, often with lower costs or higher net revenues to 
government.  As has been done in various jurisdictions throughout the world, the private 
sector can be employed to operate all or parts of customs services, prisons, parks, social 
services, and public utilities.14 It is difficult to imagine private militaries, but there is 
scope for PPPs for support services, such as logistics.  Somewhat more common are cases 
of PPPs in provision of municipal services. For a brief summary of international 
experience of private participation in provision of a wide range of municipal services 
(i.e., water and sewer in Mexico, drinking water in Turkey, and solid waste facility in 
Hong Kong SAR) see Bennett, Grohmann, and Gentry (1999). The three examples 
discussed below - which include: (1) preserving and developing historical sites, (2) 
maintaining country’s scientific potential, and (3) improving environmental protection -  
                                                 
13 Obviously, there are instances where tasks in one sector involve contacts (or client-type relationships) 
with entities in the other sector.  An example of this could be private sector mechanics (occasionally) fixing 
government-owned vehicles.  These are not included in our definition of PPPs.  However, a public-private 
partnership to supply vehicle repair services would be a PPP.   
14  We do not imply here that privatization is a panacea against all evils all the time.  Without appropriate 
safeguards, costly abuses can result in any environment.  For example, after privatization of electricity in 
California, companies such as Enron and El Paseo were able to artificially create shortages and raise prices. 
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are less common but just as illustrative of the potential of the PPP in helping the state to 
improve the efficiency of its core functions.   
 
 
 
Preservation and Use of Historical Sites – A Case for Tourism Concessions  
 
There is a long history of using the concessions model with regard to 
archaeological and other tourist sites in the world.  Egypt, Turkey, Greece, Mexico and 
several other nations have granted concessions to universities, foundations, and even 
private individuals to excavate and renovate sites.   In many economies, private 
companies are granted concessions to operate restaurants, lodgings, conduct tours, and 
other functions in national parks (see, e.g., World Wildlife Fund 2000).  Perhaps the most 
ambitious and successful use of concessions in tourism was the 20 year concession 
granted by the government of the Former Yugoslavia to develop tourism on the 
Montenegrin island Sveti Marko (Beilock and Nicolić 2000).   Similar approaches might 
be used in Armenia to lower the burdensome overhead of the country’s historic and 
natural treasures and even turn them into revenue generators.   The potential of tourism 
for Armenia is significant.  Preliminary estimates for 2005 are for 300,000 tourists, 
contributing over $150 million to the economy (Armenia Information).   This represents 
considerable growth over previous years and prospects for continued growth are good.     
 
The importance of Armenia’s heritage is reflected by the fact that this tiny 
country has five sites on the World Heritage List,15 in addition to over 1,000 
archaeological sites, almost all of which are owned by the Armenian Church or the 
government.  While there have been considerable efforts, particularly by the Church, to 
preserve and even restore some sites, for the large majority of sites there is no work and, 
more often than not, no protection.  Both to preserve and increase knowledge about 
Armenia’s history as well as to make sites more accessible and attractive for tourists, the 
government and the Church might consider a partnership for the purpose of granting one 
or more concessions.16  
                                                 
15 Haghpat, Sanahin, Geghard, Echmiatsin, and the Zvarnots archaeological site. 
16 Relative to Egypt, Greece, or even Mexico, Armenia is remotely located and, while in the aggregate its 
historic sites are significant, each site tends to be fairly small.  For these reasons, to attract qualified (world-
class) tourism industry operators, the government would be well advised to have only a few concessions 
(possibly only one), with each covering several sites.  There are advantages for the state and the Church in 
having one or very few concessions. Dealing with fewer parties lowers complexity in negotiating and 
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In brief, responsibilities for concessionaires could include: (1) excavation, (2) 
preservation, including security, (3) restoration, (4) tours and other tourist services, (5) 
encouragement of independent tourist businesses (e.g., hotels and tour guides), and (6) 
advertising. Compensation for these could be in some or all of the following forms:  
 
1. A [large] share of fees collected from tourists visiting the sites, controlled by the 
concessionaire, to provide incentives for enhancement of controlled sites. 
 
2. A [small] percentage of all tourism-related revenues, such as landing fees and hotel 
taxes, to encourage generic advertising.17 
 
3. Percentages of revenues collected by hotels and other services promoted by the 
concessionaire, to encourage development of other tourism providers. 
 
4. Rights to show artifacts on tours in other countries (with the government and/or the 
Church retaining the ownership) and to publish research results, to encourage in-
depth investigation of archeological sites. 
 
The ideal concessionaire in this case would be a partnership between a university or 
research foundation and an international tour operator.   
 
• Sustaining the Scientific and Research Potential – the Case of CRO  
 
Armenia’s image as the silicon valley of the former Soviet Union proved to be 
hard to sustain after its independence. Because virtually all research was publicly funded 
(and consumed outside of Armenia), drastic reductions in government revenues and 
disappearance of subsidies directly translated into less research by universities and 
institutes. Initial frustration of the scientific community with frequently unpaid wages and 
ever-declining appropriations failing to keep research centers afloat too often led to 
attempts to find employment opportunities outside of Armenia. Job offers were 
                                                                                                                                                 
monitoring the agreements.  Having one party overseeing several (perhaps all) sites promotes consistency.   
In addition, the more broadly defined the concession and its revenue sources, the more the concessionaire 
has incentives to do generic, rather than just site-specific advertising. 
17 This is important to give the concessionaire a stake in promoting tourism in Armenia in general. See 
section 3.2.B for a discussion on generic advertising. 
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forthcoming for the brightest Armenian scientists and engineers in Russia and Eastern 
Europe. Research in Armenia, as a result, has been in a state of disarray.   
 
There have, however, been some scattered attempts to stop and even reverse this 
trend.  One case where a PPP has been successful in preserving and furthering Armenia’s 
scientific potential is the partnership between Armenia-based, state-owned Cosmic Ray 
Observatory (CRO) on one side, and the Armenian Engineers and Scientists of America 
(AESA) and Bay Area Friends of Armenia (BAFA) on the other side. The primary role of 
the AESA and BAFA has been to provide funds (or coordinate giving from other 
organizations and private individuals) to cover overhead expenses and facilities’ 
maintenance at the CRO.18  They have also assisted the CRO scientists in establishing 
contacts with other researchers and centers. Owing partly to this cooperation, in 2002 the 
CRO was named as one of the top five solar and cosmic ray research centers in the world, 
uniting approximately 80 scientists, technicians, and support staff. Although this is not 
the only example of PPP in the areas of research and development, cooperation between 
CRO, AESA, and BAFA is a good example of how far a well-concerted effort could go 
in helping the state to improve the country’s research capabilities. In 2003, from more 
than 800 projects submitted from 136 countries, CRO won the World Summit on 
Information Society Award in the e-science category. To continue expanding cooperation 
with international space organizations, CRO signed agreements with the European Space 
Agency (ESA) 2004 and the UN/NASA/ESA in 2005. This involves the CRO in the 
preparation for the International Heliophysica Year in 2007. Specifically, CRO will 
design and produce a global network of space weather monitors, which will then be 
managed from the Aragats Space Environmental Center in Armenia. 
 
• Improving Environmental Protection – the Armenia Tree Project 
 
The Armenia Tree Project (ATP) was founded in 1993 under the umbrella of the 
Armenian Assembly of America to support the Armenian government's reforestation 
program (prompted by severe deforestation during the energy crisis in early 1990s).  By 
then it became evident that even though the government made the issue of reforestation 
(and environmental protection in general) a priority, given the lack of public resources (as 
a result of almost 65 percent decline in GDP between 1989-1993), the government could 
not devote sufficient resources to address the issue. Yet despite these circumstances, early 
                                                 
18 The primary source of funding for CRO’s research and training are foreign funded projects. 
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efforts by the ATP to work with the government failed to produce desired results.  It soon 
became clear that sustainability of any environmental protection efforts would require 
greater state and community involvement than originally envisioned.  
 
ATP has increasingly worked with local governments and individuals to develop 
its programs.  Local government agencies assist the ATP in determining appropriate sites 
for tree planting, including hospitals, schools, orphanages, senior centers, and other 
public areas.  Although ATP does not rely on local law enforcement to ensure protection 
of its project sites, it does encourage cooperation by offering incentives for the survival 
of trees: high survival rates can lead to the delivery of more trees, as well as increased 
amounts of tools and training provided by the ATP. Since then, through close cooperation 
with the government and local groups, the ATP has planted over 300,000 trees,  
employing hundreds to help replant the country's damaged forests and national parks; 
developed two nurseries; and established a fruit drying and distribution center.19
 
The success of the ATP projects demonstrate the significant contributions that can 
be made by PPPs in this area. As pointed out by Bell (2000), "by harnessing self-interest, 
and using informal incentives and discipline to enforce adherence to its rules and 
regulations, ATP is working - albeit on a small scale - where Armenian forestry laws are 
failing."  As the project continues to gain legitimacy, community involvement can lead to 
greater public support for environmental laws and protection, thereby assisting the 
government in implementing at least one of its core functions. 
 
                                                 
19 In addition to these activities, the ATP developed a coppicing program in 2001.  It worked to coppice 
public areas including the Genocide Memorial Park, the Botanic Institute of the Armenian Academy of 
Sciences, and the Martuni area of Lake Sevan National Park.  
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B. Affecting Law- and (Executive) Decision-Making Process 
 
PPPs can advance the economic, cultural, or social causes of private groups 
involved in the process.  The latter may range from religious organizations to those 
focused on health or social issues to labor unions and business associations. These groups 
then can, in practice, help government to understand the needs of their memberships 
(however wide). They could also communicate rationales behind government policies to 
their memberships.  It is for these reasons that governments have incentives to encourage 
formation of, and support for, these organizations.20  Without it, advocacy is adversarial.  
An example of this is streamlining customs procedures.  Creating and strengthening of 
groups such as the Association of Armenian Freight Forwarders can simplify the 
government’s task in determining which services are needed from customs, and assessing 
user acceptance/rating of its performance.  
 
Examples of dialog between the state and the private sector that led to procedural 
and legislative changes include the activities of “Astghik” Disabled Children’s Parent 
Union, which lobbied the government to make the design of public construction projects 
in Armenia more disabled-friendly, and the "Antenna” NGO, which successfully 
promoted changes in the Law on TV and Radio through an advocacy campaign. 
 
The potential for PPPs in this area, however, is much greater and could include 
measures leading to across-the-board improvements in efficiency of law- and decision-
making in Armenia. We will discuss three of them, which we believe have the highest 
potential in terms of their impact on shaping legal base and streamlining executive 
decision-making to induce growth and reduce poverty. These examples are Diaspora 
Agency, Anti-corruption Agency, and Public Policy think tank. Some design elements for 
each of these (in essence CONC-type) arrangements are discussed below.  
 
• Institutionalizing Diaspora’s Involvement – Design of the Diaspora Agency 
 
The potential role which Diaspora can play in Armenia’s domestic affairs as a 
source of physical and human capital as well as new mentality is hard to underestimate 
(Gevorkyan and Grigorian, 2003). With a steady flow of emigration from Armenia  in 
                                                 
20 One of the side-effects of this relationship is the formation of special interest groups that aim at 
redistributing public resources to serve their own objectives. Issues related to special interests and ways to 
deal with them will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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recent years, the term Diaspora is beginning to symbolize more than it did a decade ago, 
leaving more at stake for the government to react upon. The relationship between 
Armenia and the Diaspora has, however, so far been shallow and concentrated, far from 
being broad-based and systemic to maximize the benefits of Diaspora’s involvement in 
Armenia. 
  
A PPP could be designed to institutionalize a Diaspora-Armenia link with the aim 
of capitalizing on the full potential of the Diaspora.  To be effective, the proposed 
Diaspora Agency will have to have a status of a Ministry, have wide executive powers 
and legislative rights.  To benefit from partnership with the private sector (in this case 
Diaspora private and public groups and individuals), the Agency will have to have joint 
Diaspora and local (state-appointed) management. Its performance should be measured 
against the scale and the scope of Diaspora-led projects initiated with direct involvement 
of the Agency.21 With a dynamic and goal-oriented management, the Agency will be able 
to identify and address main barriers to Diaspora involvement in Armenia and lay ground 
for more productive cooperation.  The recent abolition of the ban on the Dual Citizenship 
in Armenia gives additional incentive to form the Agency as it allow for more active 
engagement of the Diaspora in Armenia. A successful example of a Diaspora agency is 
Israel’s Ministry of Diaspora Affairs.    
 
• Weeding out Corruption – Design of Anti-Corruption Agency 
 
Despite widespread recognition that reduced corruption in Armenia will lead to 
sizable economic benefits, previous attempts to address the issue failed to generate any 
tangible results.  The recently created committee was criticized by international observers 
and poorly received by the civil society.  Apart from issues of political will and degree of 
tolerance, this outcome has to do with the lack of a designated agency to fight corruption.  
The basic design of an efficient Anti-corruption Agency in Armenia will have to satisfy a 
number of conditions. First of all, it will need a high degree of independence from 
political influence, particularly from sources prone to corruption.  Second, to fully benefit 
from the experience and perspective of the private sector, in addition to reputable civil 
servants who enjoy wide public support, the top management will have to include private 
                                                 
21 The range of issues/projects that the Agency could facilitate may include designing volunteer and 
professional exchange programs, establishing Diaspora-funded investment and venture capital funds, and in 
the long-run also launching a sovereign “Diaspora” bond program (see Gevorkyan and Grigorian (2003) for 
a detailed discussion of these objectives). 
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sector Diaspora and local Armenian professionals experienced in law enforcement and 
judiciary. Third, the Agency will have to have its own security apparatus (an anti-
corruption police force) to help isolate it from any type of unwanted external pressures. 
Fourth, while investigating large scale corruption deals, the Agency will have to have 
prerogative over local law enforcement bodies.  (See Box 2 for a detailed account of 
Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s anti-corruption agencies.)  Finally, the Agency could work 
in close cooperation with the office of Ombudsman, which Armenia introduced as a part 
of its Council of Europe membership requirements.  
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Box 2. Weeding Out Corruption – How Did Hong Kong and Singapore Do It? 
 
Any place where corruption thrives has much to learn from Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Once amongst the world’s most corrupt places, they became two of its cleaner 
business centers. The main reason these two have succeeded where so many others have 
failed are that their fight of corruption began at the top and, just as critical, was removed 
from the hands of the police.  
 
For years though, Hong Kong was a place where the great majority of the police 
took bribes while its British colonial governors appeared not to mind. By 1973, however, 
the level of corruption people would tolerate had been exceeded. The turning point in the 
corruption fight came in June 1973, when an internal investigation revealed that a senior 
police officer, Peter Godber, had managed to skim off $550,000, or about six times his 
total net salary during his 20 years of police service. Outraged by the ability of Godber to 
escape to London and avoid arrest by Hong Kong police, people took to the streets. The 
implications were obvious. If Godber had been allowed to escape, the administration 
must be rotten right up to the top.  
 
This was all that Murray MacLehose, the new governor, needed to snap into 
action. Four months after Godber’s disappearance, MacLehose formed the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), took it out of the hands of the police, and had it 
report directly to him. The new organization had tremendous power of search and seizure 
(some of which are now subject to court orders), and anyone disclosing that investigation 
by the ICAC was underway was liable to prosecution under the anti-corruption statutes of 
the day. In 1975, Godber was apprehended in Britain, returned to Hong Kong and jailed. 
Eventually the ICAC would arrest 260 other Hong Kong policemen, and a long, sordid 
chapter in local history came to a much-deserved end. 
 
Singapore’s story is similar, if less dramatic. Its anti-corruption agency, the 
Corrupt Practices Investigation Board (CPIB), operates apart from the police and is based 
in the Prime Minister’s office. Founded but dormant under British colonial rule, it only 
started gaining power as an effective anti-corruption tool in the 1960s and 1970s. A 
crucial difference between CPIB and ICAC is that the former did not communicate with 
the public, while the latter had a community relations department and depended heavily 
on public cooperation to pursue investigation. 
_________________________________ 
Source: Segal (1999).   
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C. Improving Management Of Inherently Private, But Government-Owned Assets  
 
At the time of Armenia’s independence, in 1991, the GOA owned virtually all 
productive assets.   Since that time, GOA has privatized most, but not all, assets which, in 
developed market economies, would normally be in the private sector.  PPPs may be 
appropriate for managing remaining assets.  This is particularly true because there is an 
inherent conflict of interest when a government operates a private firm because, at the 
same time, that government is charged with regulating that firm and being impartial 
between that firm and competing private sector firms. 
 
• Improving Management - the Case of Armenian Railway 
 
Fifty or so years ago, private ownership of railroads was the exception, at least 
outside of North America.  Today, it is the norm.  Recognizing the advantages of private 
sector management, on every continent, governments have either privatized railways 
entirely or granted long term concessions to private operators (e.g., see Kopicki and 
Thompson, 1997).   Thus far, Armenia has attempted to improve the efficiency of its 
railway by moving it from a soft-budget agency to a state-owned enterprise with clear 
profit incentives.   While this certainly has been a step forward, it falls far short of that 
which could potentially achieved through contracting for a truly private operator.   
 
Virtually all Armenia’s rail freight is for cargoes moving between the vicinity of 
Yerevan and Georgia’s Black Sea Ports.  At the current time, the Armenian and Georgian 
national railways individually handle the portions of these movements which occur on 
their systems.  The potentials for coordination problems and conflicting incentives are 
obvious and are reflected by often lengthy delays at the interchange between the two 
railways at Ayrum/Sadaklho, see Beilock (1998).    
 
An interesting possibility might be a concession to operate trains between 
Georgia’s Black Sea ports and Yerevan.22  The grantors of the concession would be the 
two national railways and the concessionaire would be a private operator.   The Customs 
Services of the two countries and the Georgian port authorities may also be involved, 
since streamlining their work would significantly improve service.  The range of 
                                                 
22 It should be underscored that what is described here would not be a privatization of the railway nor even 
operational control over tracks, rights of way, and most or all equipment. 
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possibilities for such a concession is quite wide.  At one end of the spectrum, the 
concessionaire might be, in effect, a transport broker with special privileges to and 
obligations from the railroads, customs, and the ports.  Under such a scenario, the 
concessionaire would lease all locomotives, rail cars, and the rights-of-way.   At the other 
end of the spectrum, the concessionaire would own and operate the trains, including the 
locomotives, as well as their repair facilities.  In this case, only the rights-of-way would 
be leased from the national railroads.  In between, the concessionaire would own, 
operate, and/or maintain some types of equipment if and as they are able to do so more 
cost effectively than the national railroads.       
      
It should be stressed that this is not a pipe dream.  Mexico has granted 
concessions for U.S. railroads to operate into their country.  Also, several pairs of nations 
in Africa have or are in the process of forming transnational concessions.   Among these 
are Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, Senegal and Mali, Benin and Niger, and Malawi and 
Mozambique (Thompson, 2000). Further concessions in progress are Ghana, Kenya, 
Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia (Bullock, 2005).  For transnational concessions, and as 
would most likely have to be the case for Armenia and Georgia, they are brokered by an 
International (Financial) Organization, such as the World Bank. 
 
3.2. Improving Private Sector Performance 
 
Certainly, government’s primary function for enhancing private sector performance is as 
referee, enforcing reasonable rules of the game.  But government may take a more active 
role to mitigate market failures and ensure provision of services and facilities necessary 
for an efficient and internationally competitive private sector. An interesting example of 
this is Fundacion Chile: A three-way partnership of the Chilean government with private 
enterprise and the academic community.  
 
A. Reducing the Knowledge and Information Gaps 
  
In developing and transition economies, private sector performance is typically 
compromised by insufficient availability or quality of business support services, such as 
accounting, legal and information technology-related services, credit and financial 
advice.  Therefore, businesspersons will most likely benefit from training in areas like 
management, financial planning, and marketing.  It is common for government to become 
involved in meeting these needs, frequently in cooperation with the private sector.  As 
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this is primarily work of a remedial nature and rarely is inherently profitable, private 
sector partners assisting the government in addressing these shortcomings may be non-
profit NGOs. 
 
In addition, private sector performance can be impaired due to insufficient 
information and/or information asymmetries.  For example, farmers in rural villages may 
make poor production decisions and/or be disadvantaged when selling their produce to 
intermediaries due to lack of timely market information.  In such circumstances, 
government may provide such information, either directly or by contracting with a 
private firm.    
 
• Reducing the Knowledge Gap - Development Associates 
 
Lack or inadequacy of private sector skills necessary to run modern businesses have 
driven many governments in developing and transition countries to seek international 
assistance to educate the private sector about complexities of modern business 
environment. As a result, various international organizations and donor agencies have set 
programs to promote business development in developing countries. Experience of these 
agencies, however, shows that the quality of assistance is higher the closer the incentives 
of those aid agencies and their clients. Unfortunately, these agencies are poorly prepared 
for designing approaches to exploit constantly changing business opportunities in 
developing countries, therefore prompting a never-ending search for a better assistance 
strategy.23
 
An alternative approach is being proposed to overcome these problems. The heart 
of the program (outlined in detail in Beilock and Grigorian, 2003) is a cadre of 
experienced businesspersons recruited from developed countries (called Development 
Associates or DAs) to seek out and exploit opportunities for increasing business activity 
within developing countries. DAs – recruited in case of Armenia among highly skilled 
Diaspora business professionals - would work directly with businesses in Armenia which 
are wholely or predominantly locally owned.  Selected based on their skills and the needs 
                                                 
23 Programs to promote business development and incorporate should incorporate, as much as possible, 
decentralized, self-interested decision making.  Only this can provide the capacity to identify business 
opportunities, the intensity of effort to fully exploit them, and the flexibility to adapt to changing 
conditions. These are functions at which government and government-like bureaucracies, including aid 
agencies, are poor. 
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of the local company, the DAs would be assisting companies in one or more activities, 
such as product design, marketing, financial reporting, and others.  In addition to 
facilitating a transfer of skills, the DAs would be able bring in financing in the form of 
equity investments or loans to be made available to DAs through government controlled 
foreign assistance money, making this an example of public-private cooperation.24
 
The most unique feature of the proposed approach is to raise the intensity and 
improve incentive structure behind the developmental assistance. For the time and efforts 
spent with local companies, (in addition to their fixed salary) the DAs’ would receive 
performance-based compensation through the following possible mechanisms: (1) 
ownership of the “above–normal” returns to equity investments made available through 
donor funding, (2) full ownership of returns to equity investments by DAs using their 
own personal monies, and (3) revenue sharing agreements between DAs and companies 
they assist.  
 
B. Correcting Inefficiencies Related To Collective Action Problems 
 
Collective Action problems are due to externalities which take place when an 
agent is not charged fully for the (costly) outcomes of his/her actions, or he/she enjoys 
the benefits from actions of others without having to pay for those benefits. Externalities 
are also said to be present when the agent does not receive full benefits from his/her own 
action, after bearing the full cost of it.  A classic example of collective action problem (or 
free-riding) is generic advertising.  It is in the interest of the Areni Wine Company to 
advertise the virtues of its own wine, as well as those of Armenia in general (i.e., generic 
advertising).  Clearly, to the extent the former persuades customers of Areni Wine’s 
virtues, the firm benefits.  Likewise, information about the desirability of Armenian 
wines generally should enhance the desirability of Areni Wine. Other Armenian wine 
producers, however, would also share these benefits.  Areni would bear the full cost of 
generic advertising, but reap only a portion of the benefits.  As such, Areni Wine would 
be less likely to invest in generic than own-firm advertising and, indeed, would prefer not 
to facilitate free-riding from its efforts, but to be a free-rider benefiting from the efforts of 
other firms.  With firms sharing Areni’s perspective, there will be less generic advertising 
than optimal, that is, necessary to maximize total industry returns. 
                                                 
24 DAs will also be encouraged to invest their own personal funds to establish a stronger bond between the 
local companies and themselves. 
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Another manifestation of collective action problems is when there is common 
resource use.  A problem with common resource use arises when a fisherman catches a 
large number of fish from Lake Sevan - he receives all benefits from use or sale of his 
catch, while sharing the costs associated with reduction in the fishery’s potential with all 
those using the lake.  If he were to consider the total costs of his actions, he would catch 
less than what he does now, guaranteeing at least a constant or even increasing stock of 
fish.  When there are several fishermen pursuing their individual benefits, the common 
resource – the stock of fish – faces the risk of extinction, which carries heavy costs for 
the society as a whole. 
 
• Addressing Collective Action Problems - Wine and Fish 
 
The assignment of property and/or management rights is key to the solution of 
common resource problems.  In some cases, the government can resolve the problem 
internally, by establishing special-purpose agencies to manage a common resource.  
National parks are one such example.  It often is more beneficial, however, to involve the 
private sector by creating associations that take responsibility for certain activities related 
to the management of common resources in a way that benefits all users.   
 
In the case of advertising Armenian wines, an industry association might be 
formed to take advantage of a mutually beneficial publicity campaigns.  Such an 
association might work in partnership with the government’s export promotion agency in 
their attempts to increase international sales of Armenian wines.  The government could 
undertake this activity itself, but it is more likely that a consortium of private producers 
would know better the demands of their customers, and, therefore, be more successful at 
designing advertising campaigns and, more generally, internalizing other industry-related 
externalities.25
 
For the Lake Sevan cooperative of fisherman might serve well to establish limits 
on quantities of fish caught.  Fishermen might be best qualified to police each other’s 
behavior, since they are in close contact with each other and can easily monitor the 
behavior of their peers.  In principle, the development of individual private fish farms is 
                                                 
25 Still, the government might have a useful role in discouraging free-riding through its taxing authority 
(e.g., taxing all exported wines to cover expenses related to generic advertising) or by requiring all 
suppliers to be members of the consortium. 
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another way to internalize the externality of over-consuming the public resource (i.e., the 
stock of fish in the Lake).  By siphoning a small quantity of the natural resource for 
private (re)production, fishermen effectively eliminate the potential social costs of their 
profit-seeking behavior: within the limits of their own individual farms they will be the 
only ones to bear the full cost of over-exploiting their private stock of fish.26
 
In sum, there is potential for public-private cooperation. The assignment of 
property and management rights is critical in all of the cases, and the creation or 
involvement of user groups and associations (created as MCs or CONCs) often is the best 
option to ensure (public) efficiency. 
 
C. Reducing Problems Related To Small Size And Thinness of Markets 
 
Perhaps as a consequence of thin domestic markets and difficulties accessing the 
external ones, the overwhelming majority of Armenian firms are very small.  In some 
instances where the fixed costs of accessing foreign markets (e.g., expenses related to 
marketing abroad, export/import licenses, etc.) are high, size could be an important 
deterrent on small and medium size firms’ from selling goods outside of Armenia. In 
these cases, PPPs could be successfully used to facilitate formation of larger scale units, 
either as independent businesses or to carry out sets of functions that benefit from having 
pronounced economies of size.  Examples of this include agricultural cooperatives for 
purchasing inputs and/or processing and marketing products.  Particularly in the case of 
emerging industries, such as tourism, PPPs could be of advantage for licensing firms to 
ensure that the number of firms does not overshoot the extent of the market.  Such 
entities could also be employed to ensure standards, provide generic advertising, and act 
as an agent to facilitate matches between customers and vendors.          
 
• Addressing Small Size and Thinness of Markets – The Case of Tourism 
 
Relative to the size of its GDP, the potential for Armenia’s tourist industry is 
significant.  However, the thinness of the current market creates barriers for suppliers, 
particularly smaller providers unable to spread the fixed costs of aggressive marketing 
campaigns over a large number of clients.  With the celebration of the 1700th anniversary 
                                                 
26 To the extent that there are economies of scale to production of fish, establishing cooperatives of 
fishermen might be a more optimal option to follow than individual fish farms. 
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of adoption of Christianity, 2001 was a banner and unusual year for Armenian tourism, 
with approximately 120,000 international tourists visiting the country.  A more typical 
number in recent years has been 40,000-50,000 international tourists per year, which is 
only equal to the number of entrants in one morning at Disney World’s Magic Kingdom. 
 
For the Hotel Armenia and a few of the other flagship hotels of Yerevan, the 
small total numbers are certainly a problem.  But a large percentage of all international 
tourists use these hotels for at least part of their visit so each of these hotels is assured at 
least some flow of clients.  Consider, by contrast, the magnitude of the problem for a Bed 
and Breakfast or other small operator in more remote locations, such as Meghri or Kapan.  
For such businesses, the markets may be impossibly thin, with months or even a year 
passing before a tourist happens upon their establishment.  With little ability to market 
their services widely, formation rates for these firms will be low and failure rates high.  It 
is a classic chicken and egg problem: without a reasonably reliable stream of tourist, 
small tourism providers will not develop throughout the country and without these, the 
tourists will not come.   A central tourism concessionaire which is, in part, charged with 
promoting the development of small tourism providers could break this deadlock. 
 
Such a concessionaire was described above under the section on Improving 
Efficiency of Core Functions.  In that discussion, the primary focus was on a 
concessionaire to manage and develop archaeological sites.  However, the concession 
could also include authority to oversee other types of tourist sites or, at least, have 
responsibility for generic marketing of those attractions.  That concessionaire would have 
a large number of international tourists as clients.  Given incentives to promote other 
tourism operators (perhaps through percentages of their revenues and/or shares of 
tourism-related taxes), the concessionaire would be motivated to direct sufficient 
numbers of tourists to tourist operators it endorses to ensure their viability.  For a more 
detailed discussion of this approach, see Beilock and Nickolic (2002).         
 
D. Ensuring Quality And Adherence To Standards 
 
Of increasing importance for the private sector is information and assurances 
about quality.  Are the cattle from that vendor disease free?  What kind of services can I 
expect from that hotel in Sisian, Yerevan restaurant, or hospital in Gyumri?  And if I do 
not get what was promised, what recourses do I have?  Establishing and enforcing 
standards, has been a function of government since at least Hammurabi.  This can take 
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several forms.  At one end of the spectrum, government itself may dictate standards and 
carry out all certification and enforcement activities.  This is most common when there 
are significant safety risks associated with substandard service performance or material 
quality.  At the other end of the spectrum, government may sanction, sometimes even 
tacitly, the development and enforcement of standards by a formal or informal industry 
association (examples may include private sector professional groups providing licensing 
in their respective areas of expertise).  Usually the solution involves a PPP of some sort, 
with the private and public sectors sharing responsibilities for creating and monitoring 
standards.    
 
The potential for PPPs in this area cannot be overstated.  Across virtually the 
entire spectrum of goods and services in Armenia reliable information about quality, 
much less mechanisms to maintain standards, are essentially non-existent.  As such, 
many goods and services are sold as reputation goods, with quality judged by the word or 
experience of individuals buyers trust (Satterthwaite, 1979).  Moreover, information 
asymmetries regarding quality tend to erode attained quality standards and reduce overall 
levels of market activity (Akerlof, 1980).  For these reasons, establishment and 
monitoring of quality standards can potentially benefit all parties - consumers, producers, 
and government.  As discerning quality becomes more difficult the more remote the 
buyer is from the seller, increased information and certainty about quality would be 
expected to impact strongly and positively on exports. 
 
• Ensuring Quality and Adherence To Standards - From Tourism to Food and 
Medicine 
 
The tourism concessionaire discussed in the previous subsection, would be in an 
ideal position and have incentives to establish and monitor quality standards.  As the 
officially sanctioned overseer of Armenian tourism, the concessionaire would likely be 
trusted more than an unknown vendor from a distant town.  Moreover, the 
concessionaire’s rating system could be applied across a wide range of outlets, offering 
the added benefit of affording clients both absolute and relative assessments of alternative 
offerings.  The concessionaire would need to monitor quality in outlets it recommends 
and it would be little effort to translate this into a rating system, with that investment 
offset by greater ease when communicating with clients.  Finally, the concessionaire 
could sell its service of giving ratings to other vendors.  Another alternative for instituting 
and maintaining such a rating service would be an industry association.  Examples of 
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industry associations controlling quality and licensing their members as a result of the 
“quality checks” include a wide range of specialized medical and dental associations in 
the US, with their respective National Board Exams and certification procedures.  
 
PPPs could be used to develop public-private agencies or industry associations to 
establish and monitor quality standards across a wide range of goods and services.   
Possibilities for this include services to rate and monitor: (1) restaurants, (2) food quality 
at retail outlets,27 (3) physicians and/or hospitals, (4) retail petrol vendors, and (5) 
jewelry and other high priced handicrafts (both for export and also for local markets, such 
as the Vernisage). One organization that is doing this is Made in Armenia Direct (MIAD) 
(www.madeinarmeniadirect.com). In addition to the primary purpose of distributing 
artisan works globally, MIAD works with other PPPs in funding projects. Proceeds from 
sales help support two projects previously mentioned: Cosmic Ray Observatory, and the 
Armenia Tree Project.  
 
 
4.  Special Interests: From Barriers to Development to  
Engines of Growth 
 
At the most general level, any party, whether an individual or an organization, 
with a unique set of goals and the will to act toward the furtherance of those goals may be 
defined as a special interest (SI).  If the goals of a special interest are consistent with a 
desired action, the special interest can be a ready champion and partner.  On the other 
hand, a special interest with conflicting wants will be a detractor and may create barriers.  
In almost any setting and for any desired action, the responses of special interests have to 
be taken into account.  Accounting for special interests in PPPs is the topic of this 
chapter.   In well-established political and economic settings, special interests often are 
easily identified and their reactions may be constrained and regularized by custom and 
law.28  In developing and transition countries, identifying special interests can be 
problematic and there may be few constraints on, and potentially high social costs of, 
their actions.  For these reasons, addressing issues related to special interests are 
particularly important.  
                                                 
27 Such a service could be of particular value with regard to foods highly susceptible to spoiling or 
contamination, such as meats and dairy products. 
28 Examples include procedures for filing complaints and comments about planned construction, laws 
guarding against conflicts of interest, etc. 
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4.1. Strategies For Dealing With Special Interests 
 
Special interests may be dealt with through any of four basic strategies, as well as 
mixed strategies: 
 
1. Suppress/Destroy – this is appropriate when a special interest can do appreciable 
harm and is vulnerable to repressive measures.  This strategy is most frequently 
employed when a special interest is viewed as being morally objectionable and/or 
when it is believed that the costs of not suppressing would be exacerbated by (the 
encouragement of) similar activities. 
 
2. Ignore – this is appropriate when a special interest has little power to influence the 
situation and/or when the costs of effecting any other strategies exceed potential 
gains. 
 
3. Buy Off – this is appropriate when the net gains to both the special interest and the 
party that pays the special interest to alter its behavior are positive.  This suggests 
both that the negative effects of the special interest’s actions are recognized by the 
other party and that there are significant costs for the special interests in carrying out 
these actions. 
 
4. Make Part of the System – this is appropriate when the special interest’s goals are 
consistent with or complementary to those of the other party.  Moreover, in some 
circumstances it may be possible to develop reward systems which make 
consistent/complementary behaviors more attractive. 
 
With this framework in mind, in this Chapter we will explore how PPPs could be used to 
address a wide array of special interests.  Before that, we briefly discuss the multiple 
types of special interests which may be found in individual organizations.   
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4.2. Basic Definitions 
 
A. Core Functions 
 
In the political/economic context, a special interest is usually portrayed as an 
entity having a single, well-defined objective or set of objectives.  We will refer to these 
as core functions.  Examples include, a firm seeking to increase its profits, a regulatory 
agency seeking to assure adequate supply to all at reasonable prices, an NGO working to 
improve health, and a business association endeavoring to maintain standards among its 
members.    
 
An entity may have one set of core functions, acting on its own, and a different, 
though usually related, set of core functions when acting as a member of a larger special 
interest.   For example, a freight forwarder might work for expansion of its fortunes by 
seeking entirely new business, wooing business from its competitors, and currying favor 
with the authorities.  That same freight forwarder may, as part of an industry association, 
work toward more transparent and equitable laws and procedures which would assist all 
freight forwarders and, indeed, hamper its own individual efforts at securing special 
advantages.  Why would the freight forwarder’s behavior within the association be so 
different, in some ways conflicting, with its behavior as an individual firm?   It is not that 
the underlying goal of the freight forwarder to maximize its own net worth magically 
transforms.  Rather, when advantage can be wrested from others through any means, 
legitimate or otherwise, that freight forwarder has incentives to do so.   
 
Such environments, however, bear risks from official punishments for illegitimate 
acts as well as from competitors taking similar measures to acquire the freight 
forwarder’s customers.  Risk normally imply costs.  This is both because of risk-
averseness and expenses associated with carrying out and concealing illegitimate actions 
and protecting itself from those of others. As the costs become larger, illegitimate actions 
become harder to conceal and, importantly, the entities have more to lose from 
illegitimate actions of others and become more tempting targets for such actions.  This is 
exactly the mechanism which leads successful crime organizations to become legitimate 
businesses.  The trick, of course, is to develop opportunities in which the advantages 
from such cooperative ventures are recognizably real. 
 
B.  Territoriality and Shirking, Corruption and Criminality  
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In theory, entities (public or private) single-mindedly work to advance their core 
functions, without significant efforts toward other goals. Reality is more complicated.   
While organizations do, in general, devote their main efforts toward their core functions, 
they may also seek to maintain and enhance their prestige and control of resources 
beyond that necessary for, or consistent with, maximizing core functions.  We call this 
territoriality. This tendency is evident across virtually all areas of human endeavor and in 
some cases territoriality could take a great deal of efforts from entities in addition to 
those directed towards the core function. Those performing these divergent behaviors 
may be viewed as special interests.  From the standpoint of their organizations and those 
served by those organizations, such behaviors are parasitic.  At one end of the spectrum is 
shirking, while at the other end are corruption and criminality. In between these two 
extremes, there are different types of special interests whose rent seeking takes a 
combination of effort minimization and bribe maximization. The legal limit is somewhere 
in the middle – those crossing that limit are against the law.  But no matter where on this 
scale the special interests are located,  they can sap gains from organizations, and to the 
extent that they require "to be fed" by public resources, they may result in funds being 
channeled away from publicly desirable (i.e., first best) outcomes.   
 
To the extent, however, that a PPP can alter incentives systems to reduce shirking 
and/or corruption, there is potential for mutual gain, the basis for any partnership. Note 
that this spectrum of special interests is almost as wide as the menu of choices to deal 
with them discussed in section 4.1 above. In the case of shirking, to the extent that special 
interest’s goals are consistent with, or complementary to, those of the organization, it can 
be made a part of the system.  In some circumstances it is possible to develop reward 
systems which make consistent/complementary behaviors more attractive. For example, 
it may be possible to turn (threat-based) petty bribery into a performance-based payment 
system. Changing the ‘game’ for customs officers from delay and extortion to expediting 
for a premium (via special express lanes) is such an example. Also, installing incentive 
payment schemes for transit workers to cut down on shirking and poor attitudes toward 
customers is another example of how to make special interests a part of the system.  
 
The other extreme of the special interest spectrum, severe corruption and 
criminality (the “bad guys”) will need to be handled differently.  The logic behind this is 
simple: any above-zero level of tolerance towards the “bad guys” will encourage similar 
behavior and increase the costs of handling them in the future.  Suppressing or destroying 
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them would be the proposed course of action in this case. But what would make a 
program against the “bad guys” a success?  Section 3.1.B and Box 2 above provide a 
useful point of departure for designing a PPP capable of tackling these issues.  In a 
nutshell, however, for a public-private cooperation against corrupt special interests to be 
effective, the programs will have to: 
 
1. enjoy unlimited support from and ownership of country’s top leadership, 
 
2. be unexpected, swift, and decisive, with the agency in charge of the program 
given wide executive powers (at least in the beginning), 
 
3. have an active public relations campaign running alongside the main search-and-
seizure actions, to provide the general population with up-to-date information and 
solicit feedback and evidence on possible corruption cases.  
 
The above (necessary) conditions, however, would have to be accompanied by 
other transparency-enhancing measures and institutions (such as, annual income tax 
declarations by senior officials, well functioning unified property registry, laws 
preventing active ownership of private sector assets by members of the parliament and 
key cabinet members, etc.) to guarantee success of the program.  
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
 The paper first explored the underlying conditions needed for potentially 
advantageous Public Private Cooperation (PPP).  Next, the advantages and disadvantages 
of alternative structures for PPPs are examined.  The paper divides the PPPs between 
those that would enable the public sector to improve its efficiency, and those that will 
assist the private sector’s quest for growth.  Building upon this framework, existing and 
potential PPPs for Armenia—to include partnerships with business associations, NGOs, 
and the Diaspora—are discussed.  Consideration is given to the influence of special 
interests on PPPs as well as roles for PPPs in containing the impact of special interests. In 
discussing this topic the paper offers a menu of choices to deal with special interests, and 
conditions under which those choices would be appropriate.   
  
Key findings of the paper can be summarized as follows: 
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1. As with any partnership, mutual advantage is gained from having partners 
offering different types and relative amounts of assets and talents.   They can be 
particularly advantageous when the strengths of partners can offset weaknesses of 
other partners.  Such complementarities and resulting potentials for mutual 
advantage are present in any society.  Potential for PPPs is particularly good in 
Armenia due to:  
 
a. A broad range of general transition- and Armenia-specific problems that 
limit government’s ability to act as a push factor for growth,   
b. At best a slow development of public and private capacities and yet still 
significant gaps and weaknesses in the domestic private sector, and 
c. Large potential for increased cooperation with the Diaspora, NGO 
community, and foreign stakeholders (e.g., companies and governments).  
 
2. PPPs can be of advantage to help the public sector improve the efficiency of: 
 
a. Its core functions 
b. Law-making  and (executive) decision-making 
c. Inherently private, but government-owned assets 
 
3. PPPs can be of advantage to help the private sector to:  
 
a. Reduce knowledge and information gaps 
b. Minimize collective action problems 
c. Reduce the negative effects of thin markets  
d. Ensure quality and adherence to standards 
 
4. Special interests can be positive engines for change (insofar as they can encourage 
PPPs and generate benefits outweighing the costs of their transformation) or 
obstructionist/parasitic.  Through the broader viewpoint and range of talents 
afforded with PPPs, the positive impacts of special interest can be enhanced and 
negative effects controlled. 
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TABLE 1:  COMPARISON OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE  CAPACITIES AND ASSETS 
ITEM PUBLIC/PRIVATE COMPARISON COMMENTS ON ARMENIA 
Human Talent 
 
 
Throughout the world and across virtually all areas, the pool of talents in the 
private sector tends to be richer than   that in government.    It should not be 
inferred from this, however, that non-government individuals always have superior 
talents or are always preferable to those working in government.  While the pool of 
talent is larger in the private sector, there are some highly trained, experienced 
individuals working in government.  
For Armenia , this is likely to be 
particularly true because of low salaries 
for government employees and potentials 
for drawing on overseas private sector 
talent (especially Diaspora) as well as 
from domestic sources. 
Incentives and 
Intensities 
A government employee is charged with enforcing the policies of his/her agency.   
While those policies may advance the fortunes of the agency, ideally they should 
do so only to the extent that the agency’s fortune is coincident with those of the 
public.  In part to ensure independence and objectivity and in part because of 
budgetary and other difficulties designing appropriate incentive structures, 
typically official compensations to government employees only weakly reflect 
their attained performance.  On the other hand, those in the private sector expect 
compensation to be strongly related to effort and they endeavor to maximize 
returns to themselves, either directly or through their firm or organization.1 As a 
result, the intensity of effort from private sector workers is generally higher than 
for their government counterparts.  Again, it should be stressed that there are 
always exceptions to this rule.  Moreover and importantly, there are situations in 
which the broader, more objective viewpoint of government workers is preferable 
and others in which focus and intensity are the most desirable qualities. 
Budgetary constraints on GOA have 
resulted in extremely low wages for 
government employees, with few, if any 
performance-based incentives.   Indeed, 
these wages have, in part, precipitated a 
serious corruption problem, with  some 
government employees dividing their 
efforts between their work in behalf of the 
public and using their positions to extort 
the public.   For this reason, PPPs using 
private sector  workers may be 
particularly  advantageous. 
Financial Assets Given sufficient incentives, the private sector has access to almost limitless 
financial assets.       
 
 
This can be particularly advantageous 
from the standpoint of a government, 
such as Armenia’s, intent upon limiting 
its debt burden. 
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TABLE 1:  COMPARISON OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE  CAPACITIES AND ASSETS 
Physical Assets The private sector, of course, possesses a wide range of physical assets.  Of 
particular importance, in this regard are assets, such as sophisticated machinery, 
unavailable to the government, at least without incurring debt.    
 
In all nations, the government possesses significant physical assets for which there 
are only imperfect private sector substitutes, for example public lands of historic 
importance or with unusual natural features.  
 
In transition economies, such as Armenia, 
the government also possesses assets such 
as factories, hotels, railroads, farms, and 
other productive assets.     
 
Knowledge    
 
The private sector may also possess knowledge unavailable to the government.   
This does not only include technical knowledge, such the formulation for a better 
fuel mixture, but management skills and market information.   
 
Governments also can possess unique information.  All governments collect and 
compile data, such as customs records.  Invariably, some of this information is 
withheld from the public. 
The disruptions and isolation of recent 
years, combined with GOA’s austere 
budget make likely that there are many 
areas where it could gain from knowledge 
acquired through PPPs. 
Guarantees, 
Assurances & 
Enforcement 
Where information is not readily available and risks are or are perceived as 
significant, the ability to provide convincing guarantees or assurances can be 
important.   Included in this are defining and certifying attainment of quality 
standards.   Based upon its reputation and/or financial strength, a private entity 
may be in a position to provide assurances or guarantees impossible for a 
government.    
 
On the other hand, government may be uniquely able to monitor some types of 
activities, such as border crossings, and to enforce standards or conditions.    
These points are relevant for Armenia.  
For example, an international tour 
operator may be better able to convey the 
quality of Armenian tourist facilities 
worldwide than could GOA.  On the other 
hand, GOA could enforce structures, such 
as agricultural marketing orders, better 
than the private sector.   
 
Rights Certainly, legal systems grant and enforce rights for the private sector.   However, 
these rights usually can be enjoyed by government units.   In addition, 
governments have additional rights, such as eminent domain, and the ability to 
dictate additional ones.  For example, a government could assert a right to regulate 
an industry. 
For Armenia, the ability of GOA to assert 
rights could be of use to facilitate reduce 
uncertainties, problems associated with 
thin/small markets, externalities, and free-
rider problems.    
NOTES:   The private sector includes non-for-profit NGOs.   Such organizations, as well as their employees, may derive part or all of their compensation in the 
form of psychic or other rewards related to the advancement of social or cultural causes.
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TABLE 2: PPP ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES 
Relative Type Description Example 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Non-
Invasive 
Cooperation 
(NIC) 
Cooperation in which 
none of the 
cooperating 
organizations assumes 
authority over all or 
part of other 
cooperators. 
• Government agency and NGO 
divide territories to effect 
emergency relief. 
• Public and private entities 
align shipment schedules to 
take advantage of volume 
discounts.  
• Easily established and ended 
• Avoid ‘turf’ battles as do not alter 
internal managements of 
organizations. 
• May not take full advantage of 
comparative advantages of the 
cooperators. 
Management 
Contract 
(MC) 
The hiring of external 
management (in this 
case from the other, 
normally private, 
sector). 
• Government hiring private 
sector managers to run a state-
owned utility. 
• Government contracting with 
a private sector firm to run a 
generic advertising campaign, 
such as to promote tourism. 
• As no investments sought, 
relatively easy to attract bidders. 
• Contractor retains clear control. 
• Contractual arrangements can 
cover a wide range of 
considerations.  
• With no investment, it may be 
difficult to ensure that manager 
incentives correspond with those 
of the owners.  This is particularly 
true toward the end of the contract 
period and if the owner also has 
non-economic objectives, such as 
cross-subsidies to disadvantaged 
groups. 
Concessions 
(CONC) 
Identical to MC, but 
concessionaire 
required to make 
investments 
• Government hiring a private 
sector firm to manage a State-
owned hotel, with that firm 
obligated to make 
investments. 
• With investments, management 
has incentives to act more like 
owners.   
• Contractual arrangements can 
cover a wide range of 
considerations. 
• As investments are sought, 
attracting bidders may be more 
difficult than for MC.   
• End of contract period incentive 
problems similar to MC. 
Joint Stock 
Companies 
Private and public 
sector entities holding 
stock in one 
corporation  
• Government maintaining 
partial ownership in 
effectively privatized firms. 
• Government and private sector 
entities sharing costs and 
splitting ownership to develop 
a new road or airport facility. 
• Liquidity, ease of altering 
ownership structure, particularly if 
stock listed on a recognized 
exchange. 
• Being a JOC does not, in itself, 
convey the management structure. 
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